India's Sickness:
Famine
India
was very sick, both in mind and body. While some people had prospered during
the war, the burden on others had reached breaking point, and as an awful
reminder of this came famine, a famine of vast dimensions affecting Bengal and
east and south India. It was the biggest and most devastating famine in India
during the past 170 years of British dominion, comparable to those terrible
famines which occurred from 1766 to 1770 in Bengal and Bihar as an early result
of the establishment of British rule. Epidemics followed, especially cholera
and malaria, and spread to other provinces, and even to-day they are taking
their toll of scores of thousands of lives. Millions have died of famine and
disease and yet that spectre hovers over India and claims its victims [
Estimates of the number of deaths by famine in Bengal in 1943-44 vary greatly.
The Department of Anthropology of the Calcutta University carried out an
extensive scientific survey of sample groups in the famine areas. They arrived
at the figure of about 3,400,000 total deaths by famine in Bengal. It was also
found that during 1943 and 1944, 46 per cent of the people of Bengal suffered
from major diseases. Official figures of the Bengal Government, based largely
on unreliable reports from village patwaris or headmen, gave a much lower
figure. The official Famine Inquiry Commission, presided over by Sir John
Woodhead, has come to the conclusion that about 1,500,000 deaths occurred in
Bengal 'as a direct result of the famine and the epidemics which followed in
its train.' All these figures relate to Bengal alone. Many other parts of the
country also suffered from famine and epidemic diseases consequent upon it].
This famine unveiled
the picture of India as it was below the thin veneer of the prosperity of a
small number of people at the top—a picture of poverty and ugliness of British
rule. That was the culmination and fulfillment of British rule in India. It was
no calamity of nature or play of the elements that brought this famine, nor was
it caused by actual war operations and enemy blockade. Every competent observer
is agreed that it was a man-made famine which could have been foreseen and
avoided. Every one is agreed that there was amazing indifference, incompetence,
and complacency shown by all the authorities concerned. Right up to the last
moment, when thousands were dying daily in the public streets, famine was
denied and references to it in the Press were suppressed by the censors. When
the Statesman, newspaper of Calcutta, published gruesome and ghastly
pictures of starving and dying women and children in the streets of Calcutta, a
spokes-man of the Government of India, speaking officially in the central
assembly, protested against the 'dramatization' of the situation; to him
apparently it was a normal occurrence for thousands to die daily from
starvation in India. Mr. Amery, of the India Office in London, distinguished
himself especially by his denials and statements. And then, when it became
impossible to deny or cloak the existence of widespread famine, each group in
authority blamed some other group for it. The Government of India said it was
the fault of the provincial government, which itself was merely a puppet
government functioning under the Governor and through the civil service. They
were all to blame, but most of all inevitably that authoritarian government
which the Viceroy represented in his person and which could do what it chose
any-where in India. In any democratic or semi-democratic country such a
calamity would have swept away all the governments concerned with it. Not so in
India where everything continued as before.
Considered even from
the point of view of the war, this famine took place in the very region which
stood nearest to the theatre of war and possible invasion. A widespread famine
and collapse of the economic structure would inevitably injure the capacity for
defence and even more so for offence. Thus did the Government of India
discharge its responsibility for India's defence and the prosecution of the war
against the Japanese aggressors. Not scorched earth but scorched and starved
and dead human beings by the million in this vital war area were the emblems of
the policy that Government had pursued.
Indian
non-official organizations from all over the country did good work in bringing
relief, and so did those efficient humantarians, the Quakers of England. The
central and provincial governments also at last woke up and realized the
immensity of the crisis and the army was utilized in the relief operations. For
the moment something was done to check the spread of famine and mitigate its
after-effects. But the relief was temporary and those after-effects continue,
and no one knows when famine may not descend again on an even worse scale.
Bengal is broken up, her social and economic life shattered, and an enfeebled
gene-ration left as survivors.
While
all this was happening and the streets of Calcutta were strewn with corpses,
the social life of the upper ten thousand of Calcutta underwent no change.
There was dancing and feasting and a flaunting of luxury, and life was gay.
There was no ration-ing even till a much later period. The horse races in
Calcutta continued and attracted their usual fashionable throngs. Trans-port
was lacking for food, but racehorses came in special boxes by rail from other
parts of the country. In this gay life both Englishmen and Indians took part
for both had prospered in the business of war and money was plentiful.
Sometimes that money had been gained by profiteering in the very foodstuffs,
the lack of which was killing tens of thousands daily.
India, it is often
said, is a land of contrasts, of some very rich and many very poor, of
modernism and mediasvalism, of rulers and ruled, of the British and Indians.
Never before had these contrasts been so much in evidence as in the city of
Calcutta during those terrible months of famine in the latter half of 1943. The
two worlds, normally living apart, almost ignorant of each other, were suddenly
brought physically together and existed side by side. The contrast was
startling, but even more startling was the fact that many people did not
realize the horror and astonishing incongruity of it and continued to function
in their old grooves. What they felt one cannot say; one can only judge them by
their actions. For most Englishmen this was perhaps easier for they had lived
their life apart and, caste-bound as they were, they could not vary their old
routine, even if some individuals felt the urge to do so. But those Indians who
functioned in this way showed the wide gulf that separated them from their own
people, which no considerations even of decency and humanity could bridge.
The famine, like
every great crisis, brought out both the good qualities and the failings of the
Indian people. Large numbers of them, including the most vital elements, were
in prison and unable to help in any way. Still the relief works, organized unofficially,
drew men and women from every class who laboured hard under discouraging
circumstances, displaying ability, the spirit of mutual help and co-operation
and self-sacrifice. The failings were also evident in those who were too full
of their petty rivalries and jealousies to co-operate together, those who
remained passive and did nothing to help others, and those few who were so
denationalized and dehumanized as to care little for what was happening.
The famine was a
direct result of war conditions and the carelessness and complete lack of
foresight of those in authority. The indifference of the authorities to the
problem of the country's food passes comprehension when every intelligent man
who gave thought to the matter knew that some such crisis was approach-ing. The
famine could have been avoided, given proper handling of the food situation in
the earlier years of the war. In every other country affected by the war full
attention was paid to this vital aspect of war economy even before the war
started.
In India, the Government of India started a food department
three and a quarter years after the war began in Europe and over a year after
the Japanese war started. And yet it was common knowledge that the Japanese
occupation of Burma vitally affected Bengal's food supply. The Government of
India had no policy at all in regard to food till the middle of 1943 when
famine was already beginning its disastrous career. It is most extraordinary
how inefficient the Government always is in every matter other than the
suppression of those who challenge its administration. Or perhaps it is more
correct to say that, constituted as it is, its mind is completely occupied in
its primary task of ensuring its own continuance. Only an actual crisis forces
it to think of other matters. That crisis again is accentuated by the
ever-present crisis of want of confidence in the Government's ability and bonafides [The Famine Inquiry Commission, presided over by Sir John Woodhead
(Report published in May, 19f 5), reveal in restrained official language the
tragic succession of official errors and private greed which led to the Bengal
famine. 'It has been for us a sad task,' they say, 'to inquire into the course
and causes of the Bengal famine. We have been haunted by a deep sense of
tragedy. A million and a half of the poor of Bengal fell victims to
circumstances for which they themselves were not responsible. Society, together
with its organs, failed to protect its weaker members. Indeed there was a moral
and social breakdown, as well as administrative breakdowns.' They refer to the
low economic level of the province, to the increasing pressure on land not
relieved by growth of industry, to the fact that a considerable section of the
population was living on the margin of subsistence and was un capable of
standing any severe economic stress, to the very bad health conditions and low
standards of nutrition, to the absence of a 'margin of safety' as regards
either health or wealth. They consider the more immediate causes to be: the
failure of the season's crop, the fall of Burma leading to stoppage of imports
of Burma rice, to the 'denial' policy of Government which brought ruin to
certain poorer classes, to the military demands on food and transport, and the
lack of confidence in the Government. They condemn the policy, or often the
lack of policy or the ever-changing policy, of both the Government of India and
of the Bengal Government; their inability to think ahead and provide for coming
events; their refusal to recognize and declare famine even when it had come;
their totally inadequate measures to meet the situation. They go on to say:
'But often considering all the circumstances, we cannot avoid the conclusion
that it lay in the power of the Government of Bengal, by bold, resolute and
well-conceived measures at the right time to have largely prevented the tragedy
of the famine as it actually took place. Further, that the Government of India
failed to recognize at a sufficiently early date the need for a system of
planned movement of food grains.... The Government of India must share with the
Bengal Government responsibility for the decision to decontrol in March, I9t3..
. . The subsequent proposal of the Government of India to introduce free trade
throughout the greater part of India was quite unjustified and should not have
been put forward. Its application, successfully resisted by many of the
provinces and states. . . might have led to serious catastrophies in various
parts of India.'
After referring to
the apathy and mismanagement of the governmental apparatus both at the centre
and in the province, the Commission say that 'the public in Bengal, or at least
certain sections of it, have also their share of blame. We have referred to the
atmosphere of fear and greed which, in the absence of control, was one of the
causes of the rapid rise in the price level. Enormous profits were made out of
the calamity, and in the circumstances profits for some meant death for others.
A large part of the community lived in plenty while others starved, and there
was much indifference in face of suffering. Corruption was widespread
throughout the province and in many classes of society.' The total profit made
in this traffic of starvation and death is estimated at 150 crores of rupees
(Rs. 1,500 millions). Thus if there were a million and a half deaths by famine,
each death was balanced by roughly a 1,000 rupees of excess profit!]. Though the famine was undoubtedly due to war conditions and
could have been prevented, it is equally true that its deeper causes lay in the
basic policy which was impoverishing India and under which millions lived on
the verge of starvation. In 1933 Major General Sir John Megaw, the Director-General
of the Indian Medical Service, wrote in the course of a report on public health
in India: 'Taking India as a whole the dispensary doctors regard 39 per cent of
the people as being well nourished, 41 per cent as poorly nourished, and 20 per
cent as very badly nourished. The most depressing picture is painted by the
doctors of Bengal who regard only 22 per cent of the people of the pro-vince as
being well nourished while 31 per cent are considered to be very badly
nourished.'
The tragedy of Bengal
and the famines of Orissa, Malabar, and other places are the final judgment on
British rule in India. The British will certainly leave India, and their Indian
Empire will become a memory, but what will they leave when they have to go,
what human degradation and accumulated sorrow? Tagore saw this picture as he
lay dying three years ago: 'But what kind of India will they leave behind, what
stark misery? When the stream of their centuries' administration runs dry at
last, what a waste of mud and filth they will leave behind them!'
India's Dynamic Capacity
The stream of life
goes on in spite of famine and war, full of its inherent contradictions, and
finding sustenance even in those contradictions and the disasters that follow
in their train. Nature renews itself and covers yesterday's battlefield with
flowers and green grass, and the blood
that was shed feeds the soil and gives strength and
colour to new life. Human beings with their unique quality of possessing memory
live in their storied and remembered pasts and seldom catch up to the present
in 'The worlde that neweth every daie.' And that present slips into the past before
we are hardly aware of it; to-day, child of yesterday, yields place to its own
offspring, to-morrow. Winged victory ends in a welter of blood and mud; and out
of the heavy trials of seeming defeat the spirit emerges with new strength and
wider vision. The weak in spirit yield and are eliminated, but others carry the
torch forward and hand it to the standard-bearers of to-morrow.
The famine in India
brought some realization of the terrible urgency of India's problems, of the
overwhelming disaster that hung over the country. What people in England felt
about it I do not know, but some of them, as is their way, cast the blame on
India and her people. There was lack of food, lack of doctors, lack of
sanitation and medical supplies, lack of transport, lack of everything except
human beings, for the population had grown and seemed to be growing. This excessive
population of an improvident race, growing without notice or warning and
upsetting the plans or planlessness of a benevolent government, must be to blame.
And so, economic problems suddenly assumed a new importance and we were told
that politics and political problems had to be put aside, as if politics has
any meaning at all unless it can solve the major problems of the day. The
Government of India, one of the few representatives of the laissez-faire tradition
in the world, began to talk of planning, but of organized planning it had no
notion. It could only think in terms of preserving the existing structure and
its own and allied vested interests.
The reaction on the
people of India was deeper and more powerful, though it found little public
expression owing to the widespread tentacles of the Defence of India Act and
its rules. There had been a complete collapse of the economic structure of
Bengal and tens of millions of people had been literally broken up. Bengal was
an extreme example of what was happening in many parts of India and it seemed
that there could be no going back to the old economy. Even the industrialists
who had prospered so much during the war were shaken up and compelled to look
beyond their narrow sphere. They were realists in their own way, rather afraid
of the idealism of some of the politicians, but that realism itself led them to
far-reaching conclusions. A number of Bombay industrialists, chiefly connected
with the Tata enterprises, produced a fifteen-year plan for India's
development. That plan is still not complete and there are many lacunae in it.
Inevitably it is conditioned by the ways of thinking of big industry and tries
to avoid revolutionary changes as far as possible. Yet the very pressure of
events in India has forced them to think in a big way and to go out of many of
their accustomed grooves of thought. Revolutionary changes are inherent in the
plan, though the authors may themselves not like some of them. Some of these
authors of the plan were members of the national planning committee and they
have taken advantage of a part of its work. This plan will undoubtedly have to
be varied, added to and worked out in many ways, but, coming from conservative
quarters, it is a welcome and encouraging sign of the way India must go. It is
based on a free India and on the political and economic unity of India. The
conservative banker's view of money is not allowed to dominate the scene, and
it is emphasized that the real capital of the country consists of its resources
in material and manpower. The success of this or any other plan must inevitably
depend not merely on production but on a proper and equitable distribution of
the national wealth created. Also, agrarian reform is a fundamental
prerequisite.
The idea of planning
and a planned society is accepted now in varying degrees by almost everyone.
But planning by itself has little meaning and need not necessarily lead to good
results. Everything depends on the objectives of the plan and on the
control-ling authority, as well as, of course, the government behind it. Does
the plan aim definitely at the well-being and advancement of the people as a
whole, at the opening out of opportunity to all and the growth of freedom and methods
of co-operative organization and action? Increase of production is essential,
but obviously by itself it does not take us far and may even add to the
complexity of our problems. An attempt to preserve old-established privileges
and vested interests cuts at the very root of planning. Real planning must
recognize that no such special interests can be allowed to come in the way of
any scheme designed to further the well-being of the community as a whole. The
Congress governments in the provinces were hampered and restricted in all
directions by the basic assumption of the Parliamentary statute that most of
these vested interests must not be touched. Even their partial attempts to
change the land tenure system and to impose an income-tax on incomes from land
were challenged in the law courts.
If planning is
largely controlled by big industrialists, it will naturally be envisaged within
the framework of the system they are used to, and will be essentially based on
the profit motive of an acquisitive society. However well-intentioned they
might be, and some of them certainly are full of good intentions, it is difficult
for them to think on new lines. Even when they talk of state control of
industry they think of the state more or less as it is to-day.
We are sometimes told
that the present Government of India, with its ownership and control of
railways, and a growing control of and interference in industry, finance, and,
indeed, life in general, is moving in a socialist direction. But this is
something utterly different from democratic state control, apart from being
essentially foreign control. Though there is a limitation of certain capitalist
functions, the system is based on the protection of privilege. The old
authoritarian colonial system ignored economic problems except in so far as
certain special interests were concerned. Finding itself unable to meet the
necessities of the new situation by its old laissez-faire methods, and
yet bent on preserving its authoritarian character, it goes inevitably in a
fascist direction. It tries to control economic operations by fascist methods,
suppresses such civil liberties as exist, and adapts its own autocratic
government as well as the capitalist system, with some variations, to the new
conditions. Thus the endeavor is, as in fascist countries, to build up a monolithic
state, with considerable control of industry and national life, and with many
limitations on free enterprise, but based on the old foundations. This is very
far from socialism; indeed, it is absurd to talk of socialism in a country
dominated by an alien power. Whether such an attempt can succeed, even in a
temporary sense, is very doubtful, for it only aggravates the existing problems;
but war conditions certainly give it a favourable environment to work in. Even
a complete nationalization (so-called) of industry unaccompanied by political
democracy will lead only to a different kind of exploitation, for while
industry will then belong to the state, the state itself will not belong to the
people.
Our
major difficulties in India are due to the fact that we consider our problems -
economic, social, industrial, agricultural, communal, Indian states—within the
framework of existing conditions. Within that framework, and retaining the
privileges and special "status that are part of it, they become impossible
of solution. Even if some patchwork solution is arrived at under stress of
circumstances, it does not and cannot last. The old problems continue and new
problems, or new aspects of old problems, are added to them. This approach of
ours is partly due to tradition and old habit, but essentially it is caused by
the steel-frame of the British Government which holds together the ramshackle structure.
The war has
accentuated the many contradictions existing in India—political, economic, and
social. Politically, there is a great deal of talk of Indian freedom and
independence, and yet her people have probably at no time in their long history
been subjected to such authoritarian rule and intensive and wide-spread
repression as exist to-day, and out of this to-day to-morrow will necessarily
grow. Economically, British domination is also paramount, and yet the expansive
tendency of Indian economy is continually straining at the leash. There is
famine and widespread misery and, on the other hand, there is an accumulation
of capital. Poverty and riches go side by side, decay and building up,
disruption and unity, dead thought and new. Behind all the distressing features
there is an inner vitality which cannot be suppressed.
Outwardly the war has
encouraged India's industrial growth and production, and yet it is doubtful how
far this has led to the establishment of new industries, or is merely an
extension and diversion of old industries. The apparent stability of the index
of India's industrial activity during war-time indicates that no fundamental
advance has been made. Indeed, some competent observers are of the opinion that
the war and British policy during it have actually had a hampering effect on
India's industrial growth. Dr. John Mathai, an eminent economist and a director
of Tata's, said recently: 'The general belief. . .that the war has tremendously
accelerated India's industrial progress is a proposition which, to say the
least, would need a lot of proving. While it is true that certain established
industries have increased their production in response to the war demand, several
new industries of fundamental importance to the country, which had been
projected before the war have, under stress of war conditions, been either
abandoned or been unable to reach completion. My personal view is that, on a
careful balance of the various factors in the situation, it will be found that,
unlike countries such as Canada and Australia, the war has been more a
hampering than an accelerating influence in India. I agree, however. . . that
India has sufficient potential capacity to supply her basic manufactured
needs.' Such statistical evidence of industrial activity as is available
supports this view, and indicates that if pre-war progress could have been
maintained at the old rate it would have led not only to the establishment of
new industries, but also to far greater production as a whole [Mr. J. R. D.
Tata, speaking in London on May 30th, 1945, also denied that the war had
enabled India materially to expand her industries and industrial capacity.
'There may have been isolated cases of expansion, but on the whole, when armament
factories and other specialized industries connected with the war have been
excluded, there has been none. A number of projects would have been started if
there had been no war. I can speak from personal experience of projects that
have been abandoned because of the impossibility of obtaining bricks, steel,
and machinery. Those who talk about industrial and economic progress in India
during the war do not know the true position.' Again he said: 'I must prick
this bubble. It is nonsense to say that India has materially advanced and gained
by the war. For one reason or another there has been no important progress or
development in India. Rather there has been considerable retardation. In fact
what has happened is this. As a result of the war and India's contribution
towards it, we have millions dead in Bengal owing to famine. We also have had
famine of cloth. Thus, it is clear, that economic progress has been conspicuous
by its absence.' ].
What the war has
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt is India's capacity to convert this
potential into actuality with remarkable speed, given the opportunity to do so.
Functioning as an economic unit, she has accumulated large capital assets within
five war years, in spite of all the obstructions placed in her way. These
assets are in the form of sterling securities which are not available to her
and which, it is stated, will be blocked in the future. These sterling securities
represent the expenditure incurred by the Government of India on behalf of the
British Government as well as the U.S.A. They also represent the hunger,
famine, epidemics, emasculation, weakened resistance, stunted growth, and death
by starvation and disease of vast numbers of human beings in India.
Because of the
accumulation of capital assets, India has paid off her big debt to England and
has become a creditor country. Owing to gross negligence and mismanagement,
tremendous suffering has been caused to the people of India, but the fact
remains that India can accumulate these huge sums in a short period of time.
The actual expenditure on the war incurred by India in five years greatly
exceeds the total British investments in India during more than 100 years. This
fact brings into pro-per perspective how little the progress made in India has
been during the past century of British administration—railways, irrigation
works and the like of which we hear so much. It also demonstrates the enormous
capacity of India to advance with rapidity on all fronts. If this striking
effort can be made under discouraging conditions and under a foreign government
which disapproves of industrial growth in India, it is obvious tlu-t planned
development under a free national government would completely change the face
of India within a few years.
There is a curious habit of the British
of appraising their economic and social achievement in present-day India by
criteria derived from social achievement here or elsewhere in the distant past.
They compare, with evident satisfaction to themselves, what they have done in
India during their regime with changes made some hundreds of years ago. The
fact that the industrial revolution, and more especially the vast technological
improvements of the past fifty years or so, have entirely changed the pace and tempo
of life somehow escapes them when they think of India. They forget also
that India was not a barren, sterile, and barbarous country when they came
here, but a highly evolved and cultured nation which had temporarily become
static and back-ward in technical achievements.
What
values and standards are we to apply in making such comparisons? The Japanese
made Manchukuo within eight years highly industrialized for their own purposes;
more coal was being produced there than in India after many generations of
British effort. Their material record in Korea compares well with other
colonial empires [Hallett
Abend, who was the New York Times correspondent in the Far East for many years,
says in his book 'Pacific Charter' (1943): 'In fairness to the Japanese it must
be conceded .
that in a
material sense they have done a magnificent job in Korea. When they took it
over the country was filthy, unhealthy, and woefully poverty-striken. The
mountains had been denuded of their forests, the valleys were subject to
recurrent floods, decent roads were non-existent, illiteracy was prevalent, and
typhoid, smallpox, cholera, dysentery, and the plague were epidemic annually.
To-day the mountain is are reafforested; railway, telephone, and telegraph
systems are excellent; the public health service is highly efficient, good
highways abound; flood-control and irrigation works have vastly increased the
food production, and fine harbours have been developed and well managed. The
country has become so prosperous and healthy that the 1905 population of
11,000,000 has risen to 24,000,000 and the average scale of living to-day is
almost immeasurably higher than it was at the turn of the century.' But Mr.
Abend points out that all this material improvement has not been insti-tuted
for the benefit of the Korean people but so that greater profits might go to
the Japanese].And yet behind these records there is slavery, cruelty,
humiliation, exploitation, and the attempt
to destroy the soul of a people. The nazis and the Japanese have created new records in the
inhuman suppression of subject peoples and races. We are often reminded of this
and told that the British have not treated us quite so badly. Is that to be the
new measure and standard of comparison and judgment?
There is a great deal
of pessimism in India to-day and a sense of frustration, and both can be
understood, for events have dealt harshly with our people and the future is not
promising. But there is also below the surface a stirring and a pushing, signs
of a new life and vitality, and unknown forces are at work. Leaders function at
the top but they are driven in particular directions by the anonymous and
unthinking will of an awakening people, who seem to be outgrowing their past.
India's Growth Arrested
A nation, like an individual, has many
personalities, many approaches to life. If there is a sufficiently strong
organic bond between these different personalities, it is well; otherwise those
personalities split up and lead to disintegration and trouble. Normally, there
is a continuous process of adjustment going on and some kind of an equilibrium
is established. If normal development is arrested, or sometimes if there is
some rapid change which is not easily assimilated, then conflict arises between
those different personalities. In the mind and spirit of India, below the
surface of our superficial conflicts and divisions, there has been this fundamental
conflict due to a long period of arrested growth. A society, if it is to be
both stable and progressive, must have a certain more or less fixed foundation
of principles as well as a dynamic outlook. Both appear to be necessary.
Without the dynamic outlook there is stagnation and decay, without some fixed
basis of principle there is likely to be disintegration and destruction.
In India from the earliest days there
was a search for those basic principles, for the unchanging, the universal, the
absolute. Yet the dynamic outlook was also present and an appreciation of life
and the changing world. On these two foundations a stable and
progressive society was built up, though the stress was always more on
stability and security and the survival of the race. In later years the dynamic
aspect began to fade away, and in the name of eternal principles the social
structure was made rigid and unchanging. It was, as a matter of fact, not
wholly rigid and it did change gradually and continuously. But the ideology
behind it and the general framework continued unchanged. The group idea as
represented by more or less autonomous castes, the joint family and the
communal self-governing life of the village were the main pillars of this
system, and all these survived for so long because, in spite of their failings,
they fulfilled some essential needs of human nature and society. They gave
security, stability to each group and a sense of group freedom. Caste survived
because it continued to represent the general power-relationships of society,
and class privileges were maintained, not only because of the prevailing
ideology, but also because they were supported by vigour, intelligence, and
ability, as well as a capacity for self-sacrifice. That ideology was not based
on a conflict of rights but on the individual's obligations to others and a
satisfactory performance of his duties, on co-operation within the group and
between different groups, and essentially on the idea of promoting peace rather
than war. While the social system was rigid, no limit was placed on the freedom
of the mind.
Indian civilization
achieved much that it was aiming at, but, in that very achievement, life began
to fade away, for it is too dynamic to exist for long in a rigid, unchanging
environment. Even those basic principles, which are said to be unchanging, lose
their freshness and reality when they are taken for granted and the search for
them ceases. Ideas of truth, beauty, and freedom decay, and we become prisoners
following a deadening routine.
The very thing India
lacked, the modern West possessed and possessed to excess. It had the dynamic
outlook. It was engrossed in the changing world, caring little for ultimate
principles, the unchanging, the universal. It paid little attention to duties
and obligations and emphasized rights. It was active, aggressive, acquisitive,
seeking power and domination, living in the present and ignoring the future
consequences of its actions. Because it was dynamic, it was progressive and
full of life, but that life was a fevered one and the temperature kept on
rising progressively.
If Indian civilization
went to seed because it became static, self-absorbed and inclined to
narcissism, the civilization of the modern West, with all its great and
manifold achievements, does not appear to have been a conspicuous success or to
have thus far solved the basic problems of life. Conflict is inherent in it and
periodically it indulges in self-destruction on a colossal scale. It seems to
lack something to give it stability, some basic principles to give meaning to life
though what these are I cannot say. Yet because it is dynamic and full of life
and curiosity, there is hope for it.
India, as well as
China, must learn from the West, for the modern West has much to teach, and the
spirit of the age is re-presented by the West. But the West is also obviously in
need of learning much and its advances in technology will bring it little
comfort if it does not learn some of the deeper lessons of life, which have
absorbed the minds of thinkers in all ages and in all countries.
India has become
static and yet it would be utterly wrong to imagine that she was unchanging. No
change at all means death. Her very survival as a highly evolved nation shows
that there was some process of continuous adaptation going on. When the British
came to India, though technologically somewhat back-ward, she was still among
the advanced commercial nations of the world. Technical changes would
undoubtedly have come and changed India as they have changed some western
countries. But her normal development was arrested by the British power.
Industrial growth was checked and as a consequence social growth was also
arrested. The normal power-relationships of society could not adjust themselves
and find an equilibrium, as all power was concentrated in the alien authority,
which based itself on force and encouraged groups and classes which had ceased
to have any real significance. Indian life thus progressively became more
artificial, for many of the individuals and groups who seemed to play an
important role in it had no vital functions left and were there only because of
the importance given to them by the alien power. They had long ago finished
their role in history and would have been pushed aside by new forces if they
had not been given foreign protection. They became straw-stuffed symbols of protégés
of foreign authority, thereby cutting themselves still further away from the
living currents of the nation. Normally, they would have been weeded out or
diverted to some more appropriate function by revolution or democratic process.
But so long as foreign authoritarian rule continued, no such development could
take place. And so India was cluttered up with these emblems of the past and
the real changes that were taking place were hidden behind an artificial facade.
No true social balances or power-relationships within society could develop or
become evident, and unreal problems assumed an undue importance.
Most of our problems
to-day are due to this arrested growth and the prevention by British authority
of normal adjustments taking place. The problem of the Indian princes is easily
capable of solution if the external factor is removed. The minorities problem
is utterly unlike any minority problem elsewhere; indeed it is not a minority
problem at all. There are many aspects of it and no doubt we are to blame for
it in the past and in the present. And yet, at the back of these and other
problems is the desire of the British Government to preserve, as far as
possible, the existing economy and political organization of the Indian people,
and, for this purpose, to encourage and preserve the socially backward groups
in their present condition. Political and economic progress has not only been
directly prevented, but also made dependent on the agreement of reactionary
groups and vested interests, and this may be purchased only by confirming them
in their privileged positions or giving them a dominating voice in future
arrangement, and thus putting formidable obstacles in the way of real change
and progress. A new constitution, in order to have strength and
effectiveness behind it, should not only represent the wishes of the vast majority
of the people but should also reflect the inter-relation of social forces and
their power relationships at the time. The main difficulty in India has been
that constitutional arrangements for the future suggested by the British, or
even by many Indians, ignore present social forces, and much more so potential
ones which have long been arrested and are now breaking out, and try to impose
and make rigid an order based on a past and vanishing relationship which has no
real relevance to-day.
The fundamental reality in India is British military occupation
and the policy which it supports. That policy has been ex-pressed in many ways
and has often been cloaked in dubious phrases, but latterly, under a soldier
Viceroy, it has been ex-pressed with clarity. That military occupation is to
continue so long as the British can help it. But there are certain limits to
the application of force. It leads not only to the growth of opposing forces
but to many other consequences un thought of by those who rely upon it too
much.
We see the
consequences of this enforced stunting of India's growth and this arresting of
her progress. The most obvious fact is the sterility of British rule in India
and the thwarting of Indian life by it. Alien rule is inevitably cut off from
the creative energies of the people it dominates. When this alien rule has its
own economic and cultural centre far from the subject country and is further
backed by racialism, this divorce is complete, and leads to spiritual and
cultural starvation of the subject peoples. The only real scope that the
nation's creative energy finds is in some kind of opposition to that rule, and
yet that scope itself is limited and the outlook becomes narrow and one-sided.
That opposition represents the conscious or unconscious effort of the living
and growing forces to break through the shell that confines them and is thus a
progressive and inevitable tendency. But it is too single-track and negative to
have full touch with many aspects of reality in our lives. Complexes and prejudices
and phobias grow and darken the mind, mental idols of the group and the
community take shape, and slogans and set phrases take the place of inquiry into
real problems. Within the framework of a sterile alien rule no effective
solutions are possible, and national problems, unable to find solution, be-come
even more acute. We have arrived in India at a stage when no half measures can
solve our problems, no advance on one sector is enough. There has to be a big
jump and advance all along the line, or the alternative may be overwhelming
catastrophe.
As in the world as a
whole, so in India, it is a race between the forces of peaceful progress and
construction and those of disruption and disaster, with each succeeding
disaster on a bigger scale than the previous one. We can view this prospect as
optimists or as pessimists, according to our predilections and mental make-up.
Those who have faith in a moral ordering of the universe and of the ultimate
triumph of virtue can, fortunately for them, function as lookers on or as
helpers, and cast the burden on God; others will have to carry that burden on
their own weak shoulders, hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.
No comments:
Post a Comment